Disclosure Review Board Memo: Second Request for Release of SIPP Synthetic Beta Version 6.0 by Benedetto, Gary & Stinson, Martha
Disclosure Review Board Memo:
Second Request for Release of SIPP Synthetic
Beta Version 6.0
Gary Benedetto and Martha Stinson
Survey Improvement Research Branch,
Social, Economic, and Housing Statistics Division (SEHSD)
January 15, 2015
1 Introduction
We are requesting the approval of the Census Disclosure Review Board (DRB)
for the release of the SIPP Synthetic Beta (SSB) v6.0, produced by the Survey
Improvement Research Branch (SIRB) of the Census Bureaus Social, Economic,
and Housing Statistics Division. This data product is an update to the previ-
ously released SSB v5.1. In this memo we provide a brief review of the creation
of the SSB and then describe our disclosure-risk analysis. From the results of
this analysis, we conclude that the release of SSB 6.0 would not risk disclosing
the identity of any SIPP respondent.
This memo is a follow-up to our request for approval to release version 6.0 in
May 2014. After DRB approval of this earlier request, further review of the
product prior to release revealed some processing errors. Hence SSB 6.0 was
not released in the summer or early fall of 2014 as planned. Instead we xed
the errors and re-synthesized the data. This memo describes our disclosure-risk
analysis of the new synthetic data.
2 SSB Creation
To create the SSB v6.0, we rst combined nine SIPP panels (1984, 1990, 1991,
1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008) to create the Gold Standard File (GSF).
We chose a subset of SIPP variables and then standardized these data elements
across panels and merged them with SSA-provided administrative data from the
Summary Earnings Records (SER), the Detailed Earnings Recrods (DER), the
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Master Beneciary Record (MBR), the Supplemental Security Record (SSR),
the 831 Disability File (F831), and the Payment History Update System (PHUS).
We then employed regression-based multiple imputation to ll in the missing
data of the GSF to create four completed data sets, called implicates. These
implicates are identical to the GSF except that missing data are replaced with
independent draws from a probability distribution. We refer to these four
datasets as the completed data. We then use the same modeling techniques to
create 16 synthetic data sets or implicates (4 synthetic implicates per completed
implicate). These are produced by setting all but two variables to missing for
every record and then applying the above methods for replacing missing data
with independent draws from the estimated probability distributions. The two
variables left unsynthesized are gender and the rst marital link observed in the
SIPP. As was the case in version 5.1, these are the only variables in the SSB
that contain actual data from any source.
The link between administrative earnings, benets, and SIPP data adds a sig-
nicant amount of information to an already very detailed survey and warrants
careful investigation of possible disclosure risks beyond those originally man-
aged as part of the regular SIPP public use le disclosure avoidance process.
The creation of synthetic data is meant to mitigate those risks by preventing a
link between these new public use les and the original SIPP public use les,
which are already in the public domain. We also note that SSB version 6.0 will
not be linkable to SSB version 4.0, 5.0, or 5.1.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Social Security Administration (SSA)
will also review this memo and their approval is required in order for SSB 6.0
to be released.
3 Disclosure Testing Methods
3.1 Overview
Our disclosure avoidance analysis uses the principle that a potential intruder
would rst try to re-identify the source record for a given synthetic data observa-
tion in the existing SIPP public use les. In order to test the e¤ectiveness of the
data synthesis in controlling disclosure risk, we used minimum distance match-
ing to attempt to link one SSB implicate to the Gold Standard File1 . Since the
Gold Standard is built from the original SIPP public use les and our methods
of creating this le are public, the Gold Standard variables are the equivalent of
the best available information for an intruder attempting to re-identify a record
in the synthetic data. Successful matches between the Gold Standard and the
synthetic data represent potential disclosure risks. A realistic intruder would
have the SIPP public use data, and not the administrative records, so by using
1At this point we have only matched the rst SSB implicate to the GSF. We would expect
that the matching results for implicates 2-16 to be very similar to those for implicate 1.
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the full Gold Standard le we are producing a very conservative estimate of
re-identication risk.
We assume that an intruder attempting to link SSB records to SIPP respondents
would block (i.e. stratify) on our two pieces of unsythesized SIPP information,
gender and the spouse-link, and then attempt to link records within these blocks.
Hence in our re-identication exercise, we also block on gender. To handle the
marital-link, we create a wide-version of both the Gold Standard File and the
synthetic data where a single record contains all the data for both members of
a linked marriage. If there is no linked marriage, the record only contains data
for the single individual. We then match at the couple-level in order to allow
the combined synthetic data for both husbands and wives to be used in nding
a matching pair in the original data2 .
In version 6.0 of the SSB, we relax the age restriction imposed in earlier versions
and keep all individuals in the synthetic data regardless of age. This means
that our synthetic data implicates now have the same number of observations
as each other and as the GSF (783,781 observations). We used the full set
of observations in the rst synthetic implicate in all of our re-identication
exercises. Since the synthetic implicate le has the same sample size as the
Gold Standard, we know that a true match" between the two les exists.
Importantly, simply linking a record in the SSB v6.0 to a matching record in
the public-use SIPP would be insu¢ cient for an intruder to identify a SIPP
respondent. Re-identication would also require the intruder to make a second
link to some additional source that contained personal identiable information
such as names, addresses, telephone numbers, etc. Hence, the results from our
matching process are a very conservative estimation of re-identication risk.
3.2 Di¤erences between version 6.0 and 5.1
The main purpose of releasing a new version of the SSB is to include two addi-
tional SIPP panels (1984, 2008) and to lengthen the administrative data time
series to include data through 2011 for the earnings variables and 2012 for the
benets variables (previously in version 5.1, end years were 2006 and 2007 re-
spectively). We have included two new SIPP point-in-time variables (a base
weight and an ownership of a life insurance policy indicator), eight new SIPP
time-series variables that include monthly data for the time period covered by
the respondents SIPP panel (AFDC/TANF receipt and amounts; veteransben-
ets receipt and amounts; SNAP/Food Stamp receipt and amounts; workers
compensation receipt and amounts), and have made modications to the con-
tent of a few other SIPP variables (fertility history and self-reported disability
status). All other SIPP variables are in the same format and have the same
2Co-habitating same-sex partners were not allowed to declare themselves married in the
SIPP panels contained in SSB v6.0. Hence a married couple always has both a male and
female.
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content as in version 5.1, with the only exception being the correction of small
errors discovered since the release of version 5.1. We have added a signicant
number of disability application and receipt variables from the MBR and F831
data, expanding from 6 variables to 48. Likewise we have expanded the number
of SSI application and receipt variables from the SSR data that we include from
3 to 9. Appendix A provides the complete list of new SSDI and SSI variables
that we include. All new SIPP and SSA variables are synthesized and hence
we do not expect this increased number of variables to add to the disclosure
risk.
As in version 5.1, the unsythesized SIPP variables create only four cells: mar-
ried/male, married/female, single/male, single/female which all contain more
than 100,000 individuals. Hence linking synthetic implicates to each other
is no longer a concern because there are not any small cells that would make
this possible. Also consistent with version 5.1, we include a synthesized state
variable. The 1984-2001 SIPP panels combined some states into groups and
reported only the group instead of the actual state. We respected these state
groups in our synthesis. The synthesis process was engineered to assign state
codes that were consistent with the synthetic panel variable. We continue to
use state as one of our matching variables in the re-identication analysis but
the di¤erent groupings of states across panels created some challenges. For
example, in the 1990-1993 panels, state code 62 included Iowa, North Dakota,
and South Dakota and state code 63 included Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and
Wyoming. In the 1996 and 2001 panels, state code 62 included Wyoming,
South Dakota, and North Dakota and Alaska, Idaho, and Montana were each
given individual state codes. All panels from 1990 to 2001 grouped Maine and
Vermont in code 61. The 2004 panel did not contain any state groupings. If we
had simply matched on the state codes as given, an SSB record with panel=2001
and state=62 when compared to a GSF record with panel=1993 and state=63
would not have agreed on state even though the respondent might have lived
in Wyoming in both records. This would have artically lowered the matching
rate because the di¤erent state codes would not have agreed. Hence we created
for our disclosure-risk analysis a new set of codes that represented the coarsest
grouping possible and matched on these. Our coarsest grouping contained two
state groups: state code=62 for Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming,
Alaska, Idaho, and Montana; code=61 for Maine and Vermont. All other states
had individual state codes. We discuss the implications of this approach at the
end of Section 3.3, after explaining our minimum distance matching methodol-
ogy in more detail.
3.3 Distance Matching
Distance-based record linking is a common approach to estimating the risk of re-
identication in micro data. For example, Domingo-Ferrer, Abowd, and Torra
(2006) used distance-based methods to re-identify records on two synthetic
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micro-data samples. They nd that distance-based metrics perform similarly
to (if not better than) more commonly used probabilistic methods. Domingo-
Ferrer, Torra, Mateo-Sanz, and Sebe (2006) conduct similar comparisons of
distance-based and probabilistic record linking methods. This body of work sug-
gests that distance-based methods provide reliable measures of re-identication
risk.
The basic re-identication method we employed was to calculate the distance
between a given record in the Gold Standard and every record in the synthetic
implicate. The j closest records were then declared potential candidates for a
match to the source record. In our analysis we considered j = 3. We began by
sub-dividing the data in two stages. First, we split both the Gold Standard and
the rst synthetic implicate into groups based on the unsynthesized variables.
In this case, marital status(married/single) and gender were the only two un-
synthesized variables. We next split each blocking group into smaller segments
of approximately 10,000 observations in order to decrease the processing time,
which is quadratic in the size of the largest les compared. We performed the
segment split on both the Gold Standard and synthetic le so that the correct
match in the Gold Standard was always in the same block and segment of the
synthetic data used for comparison. In other words, we forced the segmenta-
tion of the les to guarantee that the correct match could always be found in
the block/segments being compared. The segmentation of the blocks used our
prior knowledge of which records were actual matches and hence our match-
ing results are conservativeoverestimates as compared to a distance record link
that could not segment the comparison les because the intruder did not have
access to person identiers that linked between the synthetic implicate and the
Gold Standard. After splitting the data into blocking groups and segments, we
then calculated the distance between a given Gold Standard record and every
record in the synthetic le in its corresponding blocking group and segment us-
ing the set of matching variables listed in Table 1. For couples, we used the
small set of variables that were common to both partners and then used both
the husband and wife values for all other variables. For singles, we used the
persons own values for every matching variable. The list includes the SIPP
point-in-time variables and summary measures from the SIPP and SSA/IRS
time series variables. The three closest records were then declared possible
matches.
We used four distance metrics. Each metric is a special case of either Ma-
halanobis or Euclidian distance. The concept of Euclidean distance is fairly
intuitive. Two variables measuring the same thing in di¤erent sources are com-
pared and we determine how "close" they are. This measure is combined across
many variables to create an overall distance measure. Mahalanobis distance is
simply a di¤erent weighting scheme for combining the distance between many
variables, using as weights the inverse of the variance/covariance matrix of the
matching variables from both sources.
In order to formally dene these distance metrics, we rst dene some notation.
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Let A and B represent the two data sets being matched. For our purposes,
conceptualize the block and segment of the Gold Standard as the A le and
the block and segment of the synthetic implicate as the B le. Denote  as
the vector of matching variables from an observation in the A le and  as the
analogue for the B le. Given this notation we dene the distance between a
given vector  in the A le and a given vector  in the B le as follows:
d(; ) = (  )0[V ar(A) + V ar(B)  2Cov(A;B)] 1(  )
We consider four specic cases of the general distance. In the rst case we
assume that the intruder can properly calculate the Cov(A;B). We denote this
distance MAHA1; and note that it is a true Mahalanobis distance; hence we
expect that this distance measure will give us the highest match rates since it
uses all of the available information, including the correct covariance structure
of the errors in synthesizing all matching variables. In the second case, we
assume that the Cov(A;B) = 0. This is equivalent to assuming that we do not
know how to link the observations across the A and B les and cannot compute
Cov(A;B). A real intruder would not have access to Cov(A;B). We denote
the second distance MAHA2, and note that it is a feasible Mahalanobis
distance. In the third case, we assume [V ar(A) + V ar(B)  2Cov(A;B)] = I,
where I is the identity matrix. We denote the third measure as EUCL1; which
is a Euclidian distance with unstandardized inputs. For the fourth measure,
we transform all of the matching variables in the A and B les to N(0; 1)
variables. Call the transformed les ~A and ~B. We then calculate the distance
using [V ar( ~A) + V ar( ~B)   2Cov( ~A; ~B)] = I. We denote this fourth metric
EUCL2, and note that it is a standardized Euclidian distance.
We make special note of the implications for using distance measures to match
on the state variable. We created a set of dummies that represented each state
or state-group and then the Euclidian distance measure, for each given state
indicator, was either zero or one, with zero representing agreement in state and
one representing disagreement. Because of our coarsening of the state categories
for the purposes of matching, we actually create more agreement when matching
state than would otherwise be present. For example consider a GSF record with
panel=2004 and state=Alaska compared to a synthetic record with panel=2001
and state=Idaho. Our coarsened state variable will have the same code for
both these states, since we grouped them together to respect the 1990-1993 set
of state codes, and hence it will appear as if state matches when in reality it
does not. This will lower the distance between the records. If these two records
are a true match" then this will raise the probability of this match being one
of the top three. However synthetic records with panel=2001 and state=Idaho
which are false matches" will also have lower distance scores and hence the
e¤ect on the overall likelihood of nding the true match" is ambiguous.
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4 Results
The Census Bureau Disclosure Review Board has used two standards for dis-
closure avoidance in past reviews of SSB disclosure requests. First, using the
best available matching technology, the percentage of true matches relative to
the size of the les should not be excessively large. Second, given a strategy
for choosing a best match, the ratio of true matches to the total number of best
matches (true and false) should be close to one-half or smaller. To this end,
we report the percentage of records that were declared a best match by virtue
of being the closest record and were in fact true matches.
Even with our conservative approach, for most blocking group-distance measure
combinations, the minimum distance match represented the true match much
less than 1% of the time. Table 2 shows the results for the four minimum
distance strategies across each blocking group. We found that the strategy that
used the greatest amount of information about the covariance of the variables
(MAHA1) performed the best, and even that strategy matched to the true
record about 0.1% of the time for singles, and about 0.3% of the time for couples.
Moreover, the last two columns of Table 2 show that the optimal strategy of
taking the minimum distance match as the candidate match was barely bet-
ter than sub-optimal strategies of taking the 2nd smallest distance pair or 3rd
smallest distance pair. Column 4 is the ratio of column 1 and column 2. If this
ratio were exactly one, then the smallest distance strategy would produce ex-
actly the same number of correct matches as the 2nd smallest distance strategy.
Likewise column 5 is the ratio of column 1 and the sum of columns 2 and 3.
For all the distance measures, the ratios in Column 4 are similar, ranging from
slightly higher than 1 to approximately 1.5. These ratios show that, at best,
the optimal strategy only marginally out-performs the second-best strategy. In
column 5 we see that the number of combined correct matches from the second
and third best matches is always higher than the number of matches from the
rst best group (ratio is less than one). Given these results, it is clear an
intruder would have di¢ culty nding a reliable strategy for producing correct
matches.
5 Conclusion
Given the results shown in Table 2, we conclude that the SSB v6.0 is not a
threat to the condentiality of the identities of SIPP respondents. The results
suggest that an intruder, even when armed with far more information than we
can reasonably assume any intruder to have, can have very little condence
that a re-identication strategy on the synthetic data will produce a match
to the public-use SIPP les. The results from our conservative re-identication
exercises produce true match rates far below the 50% upper bound, and optimal
re-identication strategies barely outperform sub-optimal strategies, both of
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which indicate that the synthetic data introduces a great deal of uncertainty for
any intruder.
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7 Appendix A List of new SSDI and SSI vari-
ables included in version 6.0
mbr_ssdi_applied_{n}: indicator for application{n=1,2,3,4} submitted
mbr_ssdi_entitled_{n}: indicator for application{n=1,2,3,4} entitles recipient
to benets (i.e. approved)
mbr_ssdi_ddo_{n}: date of disability onset from application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_doed_{n}: date of disability entitlement from application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_dsd_{n}: date of disability adjudication for application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_ddbc_{n}: date of disability benets cessation for application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_dig_group_{n}: diagnosis group for application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_benet_totamt_{n}: monthly benet amount for application{n=1,2,3,4}
mbr_ssdi_ceased_{n}: indicator for benets ceased for application{n=1,2,3,4}
PHUS_ssdi_benet_stdate_{n}: start date of disability benets reported in
PHUS{n=1,2,3,4}
PHUS_ssdi_benet_totamt_{n}: amount of disability benets reported in
PHUS{n=1,2,3,4}
PHUS_ssdi_pos_totamt_{n}: indicator for positive payment in PHUS{n=1,2,3,4}
ssr_ssi_appl_dt : Application date
ssr_ssi_applied: Applied for SSI benets
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ssr_ssi_benet: Received SSI benets
ssr_ssi_benet_fed_totamt: Total federal benet amount
ssr_ssi_ceased: Benets ceased
ssr_ssi_dig_group: Diagnosis code
ssr_ssi_rst_pmt_dt: First payment date
ssr_ssi_last_pmt_dt: Last payment date
ssr_ssi_type: Type of benet
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Table 1:  Variables Used to Match
Couple‐level variables
For couples, these variables have the same values for husband and wife.
Singles do not have the marriage variables in this list.
panel
start date of linked marriage
end date of linked marriage
indicator for linked marriage ending
reason for linked marriage ending
state indicators
Person‐level variables
Married couples:  match on the husband and wife's values for each of these variables.
Singles:  match on the person's own values only.
black number of years with positive SER/DER
other race     earnings: 1951‐2006
education:  5 categories number of years with positive deferred DER
Hispanic     earnings: 1990‐2006
foreign born average total SER/DER earnings:  1951‐2006
own a home average deferred DER earnings:  1990‐2006
deathdate exists:  person dies by end of 2008 first four moments of distribution of years
indicator for SIPP reported disability      weighted by earnings (e.g. first moment is
indicator for SIPP reported disability      "average year" where each year is weighted
     that prevents work      by the % of lifetime earnings in that year)
if foreign born, decade arrive in the USA number of months of positive SIPP‐reported
valid SIPP industry exists      earnings
4 category SIPP‐reported industry average monthly SIPP‐reported earnings
valid SIPP occupation exists number of months with positive SIPP‐reported
3 category SIPP‐reported occupation      work hours
home equity average weekly SIPP‐reported work hours
non‐housing wealth number of months with health insurance
in scope to be asked pension question      coverage
     because employed number of months with employer‐provided
indicator for dc pension      health insurance coverage
indicator for db pension total weeks with job during SIPP panel
deathdate   total weeks with pay during SIPP panel
birthdate number of months with positive income
number of biological children ever average monthly SIPP‐reported income
number of marriages number of months of welfare
number of divorces      (Food Stamps/AFDC/TANF)
year finish high school indicator for receive retirement OASDI benefits
year finish post‐high school eduction indicator for receive widow OASDI benefits
year of bachelor degree indicator for receive spouse OASDI benefits
field of bachelor degree indicator for receive disability OASDI benefits
indicator for receive SSI benefits
Table 2:  Matching Results by Distance Matching Method and Type of SIPP Respondent
Percent Correctly Matched: Ratio of best to:
Method and 
SIPP Marital 
Status Group
Number of 
Blocks
Average Block 
Size
(1) Best 
(smallest 
distance) (2) Second Best (3) Third Best (4) Second Best
(5) Second Best 
+ Third Best
MAHA1
couples 15 10638 0.26% 0.19% 0.16% 1.38 0.75
single women 24 10162 0.08% 0.08% 0.06% 1.01 0.54
single men 22 10034 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 1.09 0.57
MAHA2
couples 15 10638 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 1.09 0.50
single women 24 10162 0.04% 0.03% 0.03% 1.49 0.68
single men 22 10034 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 1.35 0.61
EUCLIDIAN
couples 15 10638 0.07% 0.05% 0.04% 1.44 0.77
single women 24 10162 0.10% 0.08% 0.06% 1.21 0.68
single men 22 10034 0.07% 0.06% 0.04% 1.26 0.70
EUCLIDIAN STD
couples 15 10638 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.85 0.48
single women 24 10162 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 1.01 0.50
single men 22 10034 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 1.05 0.53
Data:  SIPP Synthetic Beta Implicate 1 and SIPP Gold Standard File, panels 1984, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2008
